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ARGUMENT
Orem City's (the "City") inordinate delay as well as the lack of evidence
supporting a conviction necessitates this Court's remand and setting aside the guilty
verdict in this case .
..::)

I.

..J

MS. CHATWIN'S TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO SEEK DISMISSAL FOR
VIOLATION OF HER RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
Ms. Chatwin' s Trial Counsel was ineffective by failing to raise her right to a

speedy trial. Ineffective assistance of counsel exists where an attorney renders a
performance below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and the
.J

performance prejudices the defendant. State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88,

,r 14. In this case, trial

counsel failure to raise a speedy trial defense constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
.J))

Trial counsel could have and should have raised a speedy trial defense in this
action. Indeed, when it became obvious that the state's failure to timely prosecute this
action resulted in prejudice to Ms. Chatwin's defense, such an argument became
mandatory. The City has not articulated any plausible strategic explanation for the trial
counsel's failure to assert his client's right to a speedy trial. Indeed, no legitimate tactic
or strategy can be surmised from counsel's failure in this case. See State v. J\llaritzsky, 771
P .2d 688 (Utah App. 1989). Ms. Chatwin' s trial counsel's failure to raise this claim

..:J

below when the significant delay has resulted in an obvious prejudice has no justification.
Accordingly, the trial counsel acted below the objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment.
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l.

Additionally, Ms. Chatwin was clearly prejudiced by her trial counsel's failure.
Pursuant to the factors set forth in Baker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), there is at least a
reasonable probability that the Court would have dismissed the case against Ms. Chatwin
had her attorney asserted this right. The Baker factors are ( 1) the length of the delay, (2)
the reason for the delay, (3) assertion of right, and (4) prejudice from the delay. Id. at
530. In this case, not only did Ms. Chatwin have to live with the millstone of the
unresolved criminal matter, as a direct result of the city's delay a material witness was
unavailable to testify.
The City first argues that the delay in the Orem City justice court was a result of
l.

Ms. Chatwin's actions. This is not true. Initially, by far and away the largest delay
occurred in this case because the City voluntarily dismissed and re-filed this case. The
City argues that it had to do this because the justice court did not have jurisdiction over
the matter. But it is wholly and solely within the City's discretion where to file the action.
Further, the City originally opted to file the action as a Class B misdemeanor. Thus, the
Orem City Justice Court did have jurisdiction over the matter. However, a year after
filing the action and on the eve of trial, the City dismissed the Class B action and re-filed
the action in the Fourth District Court. Again, there can be no fault attributed to Ms.
Chatwin of the City's decision to file in its hometown arena, only to dismiss and re-file
the action in the proper forum. Courts around the Country have held that the total action,
including the time that the prosecutor filed, dismissed, and re-filed is part of the analysis
of delay. See e.g., Ortiz v. State, 326 P.3d 883,

1 40 (Wyoming 2014)

("Dismissal and
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.J

re-filing the charges does not restart the clock" for "purposes of the constitutional
.J

analysis.") .
That the court of the City's choosing did not have jurisdiction over the matter is
100% the fault of the City and the long ensuing delay is also the fault of the City. The

..J

City does not have the right to delay, dismiss, and re-file with impunity. It must respect
Ms. Chatwin's Constitutional rights.
The City claims that it was Ms. Chatwin' s fault her case was delayed. This is not
true. Here, Ms. Chatwin sought one continuance in November of 2016. A one month
continuance can hardly explain why the City took 18 months to prosecute a simple
misdemeanor. It took the City three months after the issuance of the citation for the City
to even schedule the first appearance. Additionally, while Ms. Chatwin did miss a hearing
in December of 2016, there is no evidence that she received notice of this hearing. It is
telling the trial court did not issue a bench warrant or other sanction for this failure to

4)

appear and simply rescheduled the hearing. In short, there is simply no evidence that Ms.
Chatwin is responsible for the exceptional delay in this matter.
Additionally, the inability to have a material witness at trial is huge prejudice that
the City callously disregards. Ms. Chatwin cannot be responsible for ensuring that the
witnesses do not leave the country when the City takes 18 months to bring a case to trial.

4

She does not have that power. Further, the City speculates that this witness was
unavailable during the first scheduled trial. However, it is unclear at best whether he was
out of the country when the trial was originally set, or if the witness was in Provo in the
Missionary Training Center at the time. In any case, the City does not contest that this
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witness had important testimony that would have contradicted the evidence provided by
his father. But the City did not disclose that this witness was unavailable when it
dismissed the original action. The City waited over a year before dismissing the action on
the eve of trial and re-filed it in the Utah District Court. The significant delay was the
result of the choices made by the City.
Further, the City also disregards the cloud of being accused and the prejudice that
this caused Ms. Chatwin. Indeed, the City seems to suggest that because Ms. Chatwin
was not incarcerated while waiting for her trial, the right to speedy trial does not apply.
This is inaccurate. The City quotes State v. MacNeill, 2012 UT App 263, for the
proposition that "the right to a speedy trial is not to prevent prejudice to the defense
caused by the passage of time but rather to minimize the possibility of lengthy
incarceration prior to trial." (Opp. Brief P. 14. (citing US. v. MacDonald, 456 US 1, 8
(1982)).) However, the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he speedy trial guarantee is designed to
minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but
nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on
bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved
criminal charges." US. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982).
Ms. Chatwin unnecessarily suffered this substantial impairments in the 18 months
before she finally had her trial. Indeed, the US Supreme Court wrote, "arrest is a public
act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or
not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his
associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his
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friends." Id. (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-533 (1972).) Accordingly, Ms.
vi)

Chatwin suffered prejudice as a result of the delay in bringing this case to trial. The City
also cites to State v. Miller, 74 7 P .2d 440, 443 (Utah App 1987) for the proposition that a
defendant may not claim the anxiety and stress of being accused of a crime as a violation
of the right to a speedy trial without pressing a case forward. However, in State v.

1\;fifler.

the defendant filed multiple motions that delayed the case. Id. That is not true in this case.
'vJ

In this case, Ms. Chatwin asked for one continuance. She did not get notice of the next
hearing. She told her attorney from the outset she wanted to go to trial as soon as
possible. All the other delays were the direct result of the City's choices .

..,J

Ms. Chatwin' s right to a speedy trial was violated. Her counsel erred by not
seeking the dismissal of the action against her. The United States Supreme Court set forth
vJ

in Baker that the right to a speedy trial is not waived based on a failure to claim it. This is
especially true where the failure to argue this important constitutional right is not a result
of a defendant acting alone, but a defendant who was relying on the competency of her
attorney to make the arguments for her. Under the Baker factors, Ms. Chatwin's right to a
speedy trial was violated. Specifically, an 18-month delay for a simple misdemeanor is
unreasonable. The City is responsible for this delay based on its decision to file the suit in
its home court and waiting until the eve of trial to re-file it. Ms. Chatwin suffered

..,J

prejudice from the delay in that a material witness was unavailable to testify, and she
suffered the anxiety of the millstone of prosecution for a year and half. While Ms.
Chatwin did not expressly assert her right to a speedy trial, this is the failure of her

vJ)
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attorney and the basis of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, this
Court should hold that Ms. Chatwin received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finally, the City's reliance on State v. Steele, 20 IO UT App 185 is misplaced. The
City argues that pursuant to Steele, to make an argument that a speedy trial violation
occurred. Ms. Chatwin must marshal evidence. This is simply not true. Unlike in Steele,
Ms. Chatwin argues her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to seek a dismissal based on the violation of her right to a speedy trial. As set forth above,
to show ineffective assistance of counsel, Ms. Chatwin need only show deficient
performance and prejudice. Prejudice exists if, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984 ). "A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'~ Id. In this case. such
a reasonable probability exists. Here there is a probability that had Ms. Chatwin' s trial
counsel asked the court to dismiss this case because her rights to a speedy trial were
violated, she may have been granted that right. There is accordingly no need to marshal
evidence.

II.

THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION
IN THIS MATTER.
Further, there is clearly insufficient evidence to support a conviction in this case.

To establish a criminal trespass, the City must prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. I 989). This Court
should reverse a jury verdict when it finds that the evidence is '"so inconclusive or
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v)

inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime." Id.
The City claims that Ms. Chatwin committed criminal trespass pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-206 under three different theories. This is initially problematic as the
City failed in the eighteen months leading up to trial, at trial, and now after trial to
identify its theory of culpability. Nevertheless, under any of the three theories, the City
..0

failed to present adequate evidence to uphold Ms. Chatwin's conviction.
A.

There is no evidence that Defendant acted Recklessly as to whether her
presence will result in fear.

The City's first theory is that Ms. Chatwin acted recklessly as to whether her
presence will result in fear when she entered the home after seeing a grmvn man choke

Ji)

her teenage brother. The City specifically argues that based on the "reasonable
inferences" of the evidence presented, there is an adequate basis for the jury to conclude
that Ms. Chatwin acted recklessly as whether her presence will cause fear. The City is
incorrect.
To support the City's reasonable inference theory, the City undertakes the same

9

tactic in this appeal as it took at trial: focus on the bad acts of Ms. Chatwin's teenage
brother. In a story more appropriate for romantic pages of Chaucer, Ms. Chatwin's
brother went to his rivals home and fought for a girl's affection. This conduct is not okay,
but it does not mean that Ms. Chatwin trespassed.
The uncontroverted testimony in this case is that is that after Ms. Chatwin saw her

J

.J

brother being choked by an adult, she went to the home. (R.277:7-10.) Although there is
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a dispute as to whether Ms. Chatwin entered the home to break up the fight or remained
outside, even if she did enter the home there is no evidence that her entrance was reckless
as to whether her presence will cause fear. This is especially true where her presence was
clearly an effort to stop a melee.
Indeed, if Ms. Chatwin were walking by a random house and saw through an open
door two individuals fighting and entered the house to break up the fight, her action
would never be a conscious disregard that a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her
presence will cause fear. Any risk of fear would be considered de minimus and justified.
However, in this case the City focuses on the conduct of Ms. Chatwin's brother to
formulate what amounts to guilt by association argument. The undisputed evidence is that
Ms. Chatwin's brother never shared this desire to fight his rival with Ms. Chatwin. Ms.
Chatwin did not accompany her brother to the door, and only exited the car to stop the
fight after she saw an adult choke her brother. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 explicitly
justifies the use of force to defend a third person. Certainly if the use of force is justified,
the mere presence in the home to break up the fight must also be justified. As set forth in
the opening brief, the home owner did not feel afraid by Ms. Chatwin' s presence. This is
strong evidence that Ms. Chatwin did not act with the prerequisite intent.
While the City is correct that this Court should look at the evidence in light most
favorable to the jury verdict, this Court should not make any and all reasonable
inferences to fill the gaps left in the evidence. See State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 443
(Utah 1983) (overturning a jury verdict where there was disputed inference from the
evidence regarding the defendant's intent.) The City may not rely on inference to
11
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overcome the lack of evidence. There is no evidence that Ms. Chatwin was reckless as to
whether her presence in the home where she was trying to break up a fight created a
substantial and unjustified risk of fear. Because this necessary element of trespass was
unproven, this Court should overturn the jury verdict in this case.
B.

All evidence is that Ms. Chatwin left the home when asked.

Alternatively, this Court argues that Ms. Chatwin trespassed because even if her
presence was justified, Ms. Chatwin failed to leave upon request. Again, this is not true.
The City admits Ms. Chatwin left the home within 30-45 seconds upon request.
Even if it took 30-45 second - which the home owner admits is a rough estimate - that
evidence does not support a conviction for criminal trespass.
When being asked to leave, Ms. Chatwin was out within seconds. To commit
trespass~ Ms. Chatwin must remain on the property after receiving notice against
entering. This is exactly what she did. Less than a minute after being told to leave, she
was in the car. In Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 133 (1964) the United States
Supreme Court recognized a criminal trespass action where a party was asked to leave
and ,vas given ··reasonable time" to comply. Here, leaving 30 seconds after being told is
quite reasonable, especially in light if Ms. Chatwin's testimony that she was trying to
jockey herself between the home owner and her brother so the home owner could not
continue his assault. The City has provided no precedent that leaving 30-45 seconds after
being told to do so is anything but reasonable. Accordingly, this Court should overturn
the trial jury's decision as there is a lack of evidence that Ms. Chatwin refused to leave or
did so outside of a reasonable time.
12
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C.

A door is not an enclosure based on the Supreme Court's precedent.

Finally, the City claims that Ms. Chatwin committed criminal trespass because the
house had a door. As set forth, in the opening brief, it is already long-settled law in Utah
that entering into a building with a locked door is not criminal trespass under the statute
that provides for trespass into a property as to which notice against entry is gi vcn by
fencing or other enclosure. In State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1985) the Utah
Supreme Court held,
[breaking a window to enter a locked building] is
distinguishable from entry on property as to which notice
against entry is given by fencing or other enclosure obviously
designed to exclude intruders. Under well-established rules of
statutory construction, the language of this statute can hardly
be stretched to encompass the forced entry into a locked
building. The general word "enclosure" is restricted to a sense
analogous to the less general word "fence."
FurtheL the City's argument that an unimproved lot is given more protection than
a house is simply not accurate. But even if it were the case, it is not incumbent upon the
City or the courts to create and enforce common-law criminal penalties. Indeed, if such a
massive hole exists in Utah criminal jurisprudence, the legislature could have easily
remedied it decades ago. The reality is that Utah criminal statutes provide more than
adequate protection for homes. The subsection that provides notice of private property
via a •·fence or other enclosures" is just not one of them. Ms. Chatwin can accordingly
not be held criminally liable under this provision for entering the home.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should conclude that Ms. Chatwin's trial counsel was ineffective by
failing to raise Ms. Chatwin's rights to a speedy trial. Alternatively, this Court should
conclude that the jury had insufficient evidence to enter a guilty verdict for criminal
trespassing.
DATED this 12 day of November, 2018.

AVERY BURDSAL & FALE, PC

l,Jj)

Nathan E. Burdsal
Attorney for Appellant
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